An EU–US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) has been a key element of transatlantic cooperation in trade and technology in global challenges against a backdrop of decades of complex disputes, regulatory cooperation failures and minimalistic combined multilateralism. It was by intent seeking to move beyond regulatory cooperation and instead was to focus upon policy and shared global challenges. The TTC has evolved during a US administration prioritizing soft law in international economic law, arguably increasingly influencing the EU. The TTC has a complex and bifurcated approach to law that is explored here, arguably evident of its post-Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) identity in an era of a shift away from trade agreements. This paper argues that its soft law structures, executive to executive set-up and wide-ranging emphasis on international law-making goals contrasts considerably with certain developments in EU–US data and digital trade governance, involving hard law solutions. The TTC aligns well with broader trends in international economic law preferring soft law solutions. The TTC raises questions as to the place of global law-making goals in the complex transatlantic relationship. It examines its overtly legalistic framing yet heavily delegalized outcomes using soft law, grounded in international law references.
European Foreign Affairs Review